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More poliing redues rime but little is known about the mehanism. Does
poliing deter rime by reduing its attrativeness, or beause it leads to additional
arrests of reurrent riminals? This paper provides evidene of a diret link between
poliing and arrests. During shift hanges a peuliar redeployment of polie patrols
belonging to separate polie fores disrupts poliing and lowers the likelihood of
learing robberies with an arrest by 30 perent. There is no evidene that riminals
exploit these dips in polie performane. A bak of the envelope alulation suggests
that inapaitation explains 2/3 of the elastiity between robberies and poliing.
Keywords: polie, rime, in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itation, deterrene, arrests, deployment, quasi-
experiment, shift hanges
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1 Introdution
Over the last 15 years more and more evidene in the eonomis of rime literature has
shown that more poliing redues rime.
12
But the mehanism behind is still unknown
and has reently been alled a blak box (Cook et al., 2011, Durlauf and Nagin, 2011).
Two hannels ould potentially be at work: deterrene and inapaitation. On the one
hand, riminals might be deterred from ommitting a rime by the mere presene of more
poliemen, or, more generally, by the pereption that the ertainty of punishment inreases
when there is more poliing (see the seminal ontributions of Beker, 1968, Ehrlih, 1973).
On the other hand, the additional polie fores might be produtive and lear more
rimes, whih would lead to more arrests and onvitions, hene inapaitating the ar-
rested riminals from ommitting additional rimes for as long as they are in ustody.
3
A
neessary ondition for the presene of inapaitation is that additional poliing inreases
the likelihood that after ommitting an oense riminals are put in ustody. This paper's
main aim is to provide evidene on suh mediating mehanism (see Ludwig et al., 2011,
for a disussion on mediating mehanisms).
Reent papers exploit hanges in highly visible and predominantly stati polie de-
ployment following terrorist attaks (Di Tella and Shargrodsky, 2004, Draa et al., 2011,
Klik and Tabarrok, 2005, Mahin and Marie, 2011). These are ideal onditions to mea-
sure deterrene, and all four papers observe loalized and abrupt hanges in rime rates.
4
This study fouses on a dierent but ommon type of poliing, automobile patrolling.
Aording to reent poliing statistis nearly 7 in 10 loal polie oers had regular
patrolling duties, and almost all U.S. loal polie departments use regularly sheduled
automobile patrols (Reaves, 2011). As suh, this researh omplements previous researh.
Changes in mobile patrolling ould be harder to detet and might be less prone to gener-
ating deterrene.
I use detailed data on the universe of ommerial robberies that happened in Milan
between January 2009 and June 2011, and the ontemporaneous exlusive deployment
1
See, among others, Buonanno and Mastrobuoni (2011), Corman and Moan (2000),
Evans and Owens (2007), Levitt (1997), Chaln and MCrary (2013).
2
In ontrast a large riminologial literature has generally failed to nd signiant impats of polie on
rime, even in quasi-experimental studies (see Sherman, 2002, Skogan and Frydl, 2004, for an overview
of suh evidene). Sherman and Weisburd (1995) represents a notable exeption.
3
The produtivity of polie departments is often judged based on learane rates
(Gariano and Heaton, 2010, Mas, 2006).
4
Skogan and Frydl (2004) review the riminology literature on the eetiveness of poliing. The studies
that evaluate the eet of poliing on rime generally nd that rime spikes during strikes. But strikes
are perfetly preditable and known, and when they happen most of the hange in rime seems to be
driven by the sudden and omplete lak of deterrene.
2
of two very similar polie fores together with a unique rotating mehanism of polie
deployment to estimate the eet of a disruption in poliing on a binary variable measuring
whether suh rimes have been leared.
5
Until the mid-nineties, in all major Italian
ities two polie patrol fores (the Polizia, the polie, and the Arma dei Carabinieri, the
gendarmerie) were patrolling the streets.
6
Then, in an attempt to rationalize resoures,
ities were divided into three parts, assigning exlusive ontrol to the Polizia and to the
Carabinieri of 2/3 and 1/3 of the ity.
The assignment of these areas rotates during shift hanges four times a day, induing
patrols to poorly oordinated and time-onsuming trips aross the ity. When there
is a shift hange polie patrols that are nishing their shift head for the headquarters,
while polie patrols that are starting their shift drive from the headquarters towards the
area they have been assigned. The large blak irle on the map of Milan shown in
Figure 1 shows the loation of the two headquarters. Both are loated in the very ity
enter, a few hundred yards from eah other.
7
The map shows also the exat loation
of eah ommerial robbery that happened in Milan by the intervening fore.
8
Overall,
the Polizia and the Carabinieri over the entire ity, and, based on Google maps, the
vitimized businesses are on average a 15 minute drive from the two headquarters.
The underlying rotation mehanism is shown in Figure 2. Eah panel represents a
smaller version of Figure 1, depiting polie overage by shift (night, morning, midday,
evening) and rotation day. For example, the two Panels rotation day 1, night and
rotation day 1, morning imply that during rotation days of type 1 at 7am Carabinieri
patrols move from the North-Western area to the North-Eastern one. At the following
shift hange they move to the Southern area, et.
Whether suh shift hanges disrupt poliing depends on institutional rules, the behav-
ior of polie oers, and hane. Aording to the law shift hanges should our diretly
5
About thirty years ago a few papers have looked at this mediating mehanism (Carr-Hill and Stern,
1973, Craig, 1987, Mathur, 1978, Thaler, 1977, Wolpin, 1978). Using simultaneous equations models with
non-testable identiation restritions, most of these papers nd support the existene of both deterrene
and inapaitation. In partiular, in Thaler (1977) individual rime-level learane rates, similar to the
ones used in this study, are shown to respond strongly to hanges in the number of polie oers. The
issue is that suh deployment is likely to be endogenous. In the riminology literature little evidene
is found of an eet of poliing on learane rates (Cordner, 1989, Skogan and Frydl, 2004), but again
deployment of polie fores is likely to be endogenous.
6
Italy is not the only European ountry with two major polie fores. In addition to the polie
fores Frane deploys the Gendarmerie, the Netherlands the Royal Marehaussee, Portugal the National
Republian Guard, Romania the Gendarmerie, Poland the Military Gendarmerie, and Spain the Guardia
Civil.
7
The exat addresses are Via Fatebene Fratelli and Via della Mosova.
8
Setion 2 fouses on the temporal and spatial distribution of robberies by the intervening polie fore,
onrming that suh reassignments do take plae.
3
on the street at the hour sharp, thus doubling the presene of polie ars around that
time. Sine shift hanges happen at 7am, 1pm, 7pm, and 12am, inoming patrols operate
up to the hour, and outgoing ones operate past the hour. Whenever polie patrols follow
the law, during shift hanges the number of visible polie ars doubles.
9
Yet, at any given
point in time only one ar is formally on duty, and so the number of ative ars stays
onstant.
But there is evidene, disussed in Setion 2.2, that at times the number of funtioning
polie ars is insuient to perform all shift hanges on the street. When this happens
inoming and outgoing patrols share the same polie ar, and patrols drive from the area
they were seuring to the polie headquarters, whih are loated in the ity enter (the
exat loation is shown in Figure 1), before performing what the Polizia alls a ar
on ar shift hange (mahina su mahina). While the swithing of the rews inside
the headquarters takes a few minutes, driving from the assigned neighborhood to the
headquarters and bak to the newly assigned neighborhood takes on average 30 minutes.
Moreover, the severity of the onsequent disruption in polie patrolling is inreasing in
the distane between the assigned neighborhood and the headquarters. I use the exat
time of the robbery and the exat distane from the headquarters measured in driving
time to predit whether the inoming or the outgoing polie patrol ould have reahed the
vitimized ommerial business on time. Sine there is no information on the inidene
of ar shortages aross shift hanges and ity areas, this study estimates the intention to
treat eet of shift hanges.
In partiular, information about the swithing of the areas of deployment, as well as
on the exat time of robberies and the exat distane between robbed businesses and the
polie headquarters, allows me to estimate the eet of disrupting polie patrolling on a
binary variable measuring whether the robbery has been solved (meaning that at least
one arrest has been made), an often used measure of polie produtivity.
10
Aording
to the law shift hanges happen at the hour sharp, and any unobserved delay biases the
results towards zero. Despite suh bias, I nd a 30 perent redution in the likelihood of
solving a rime through an arrest during shift hanges. The disruption is entirely driven
by robberies that happen far from the polie headquarters.
9
To assess the importane of the lak of oordination aross the two polie fores and the resultant
lak of ontinuity of ontrol over a territory, later I exploit the fat that the Polizia retains ontrol in one
of the three rotating areas.
10
Aording to the Milan Polizia learing a robbery means that at least one robber has been identied,
leading to a future arrest. But most times the identied oender hooses to ollaborate with the polie
identifying his fellow oendersto reeive sentene redutions. For this reason I use learanes and arrests
as synonymous.
4
Given how important it is for poliy purposes to disentangle deterrene from inapa-
itation,
11
in Setions 2.2 and 5 the study addresses in great detail whether an endogenous
response of riminals an explain the observed redution in learanes during shift hanges.
The rihness of the miro-level data allows me to perform a battery of tests for suh
endogeneity. The tests are based not only on the hoie of time and loation of robbers,
on the omposition of robbers during shift hange periods, but also on the dynami (learn-
ing) behavior of robbers. Yet the single most powerful test is that there is no evidene
that during shift hanges robbers are more likely to target businesses whih are loated
away from the headquarters, whih, given the results on learanes, even onsidering
ounterating strategies by the polie fores, is shown to be a dominant strategy.
There are several fators that make it hard for riminals to selet shift hanges as the
best time to rob businesses: i) when shift hanges are done aording to the law, deterrene
should doubles rather than being redued (even if the number of ative polie ars is xed);
ii) if robbers knew the timing of shift hanges, they would still need to predit where the
shortage of polie ars is going to take plae, and the polie fores have an inentive to
keep the loation unpreditable;
12
; iii) when there are ar on ar shift hanges, for most
of the time patrols that are driving from or toward the headquarters are still visible and
generate deterrene;
13
; iv) several speial polie fores, whose ars are indistinguishable
from the other ones, follow dierent shifts;
14 15
and, nally, v) despite the doubling of
11
Deterrene does not imply additional osts, while inapaitation does (riminals are put on trial,
spend time in jail, might reeive job training and ounseling one released, et.).
12
In Setion 2.2 I disuss equilibria in a game between polie fores and robbers to determine the
loation of robberies and ar on ar shift hanges.
13
Like many historial European ities, Milan has a highly haoti network of streets (a map is shown
in the Online Appendix Figure 1), and it would be hard for anyone to predit from the diretion whether
the Polie ars are driving to the headquarters.
14
The reparti mobili (mobile fore), the squadre mobili (mobile teams), the ars of the neighborhood
Polizia and Carabinieri oes (ommissariati di polizia and stazioni dei Carabinieri), the poliziotti di
quartiere (neighborhood polie oers), and the motoilisti (motorbikers) operate over the entire ity
without rotating, and follow two shifts (8am-2pm and 2pm-8pm) that dier from the ones followed by
the rotating orps. For example, aording to Bassi (2011) 3 out of 20 loal Polizia oes in Milan
have an operating Polizia ar, and suh ar as well as most ars of the other speial fores would not
be distinguishable from the about 15 ars that operate for the Polizia di Stato headquarters, whih are
the ones whih rotate and try to ontrast the most ommon rimes, inluding robberies. In short, during
shift hange periods several Polizia and Carabinieri ars are potentially driving around the ity but the
patrol ars that, following an inident, get alled by the Polizia or Carabinieri operation enter are either
on their way toward the headquarters, or on their way from the headquarters to the inident loation,
or, whenever there is a shortage of ars, potentially inside the headquarters.
15
Even if the hange in poliing was somehow visible, the lak of (negative) deterrene might still be
related to what riminologists all residual deterrene (Sherman, 1990). Some evidene suggests that
the deterrene eet of highly visible polie rakdowns persists well beyond their essation, possible due
to riminal pereptions that adjust slowly over time. These adjustments might arguably be even less
likely to our when the hanges in poliing are short-lived (a few minutes) and errati (dependent on
5
fores presribed by the law during shift hanges, this is the rst study providing evidene
of a redued produtivity of poliing. Criminals would have to base their deisions on
their own experiene and on the experienes of their riminal aquaintanes. While one
annot rule out suh a ommon wisdom about shift hanges, suh ommunality would
be easier to detet in the data, and there is no evidene of it.
In Setion 6 I disuss under whih onditions the eet of polie disruptions on arrests
(the mediating mehanism) an be used to learn something about the size of the ina-
paitation eet. When more poliing inreases the likelihood of learing and arresting
repeat oenders, under some onditions (large reoending rates, immediate inareration,
and suiently long sentenes), rime rates are inversely proportional to learane rates,
implying that the elastiity of rime with respet to poliing equals the negative elastiity
of learane rates with respet to poliing. Provine level satter plots of rime rates
against learane rates (see Setion 6.2) provide some suggestive evidene about suh
inverse proportionality.
16
The panel dimension of the data allows me to measure atual reoending rates (not
just rearrest rates). More than one third of robbers will reoend until they are arrested.
Arrested robbers await in jail for trial, and are onvited with probability that is almost
one. Combining the estimated eets on polie produtivity (learanes) with the total
elastiity of rime with respet to poliing one an separate inapaitation from deterrene.
The implied split between deterrene and inapaitation for polie patrols that are ghting
robberies against businesses is 1/3 and 2/3.
2 The Ideal and the Quasi-experiment
Most researhers have foussed on the deterrene eet of poliing, and, until reently,
the main strategy was to use aggregate rime regressions (Durlauf et al., 2010).
17
the availability of polie patrols).
16
The Appendix Figure 11 shows that for thefts, burglaries, and pik-poketing there is evidene on
inapaitation is weaker, and is totally absent for assaults.
17
Levitt (1998) uses suh regressions to identify deterrene and inapaitation from the dierential
response of spei rime rates (e.g. robbery rates, theft rates, et.) to the learane rates of other types
of rimes.The identiation assumption is that deterrene for a spei rime does not depend on the
learane rate for other rimes. Rapes and robberies appear to be the only rimes for whih inapai-
tation appears to be larger than deterrene (their relative size is 2 for rapes and 1.2 for robberies). An
additional paper, MCormik and Tollison (1984), uses very detailed information on sports rather than
rime, and nds that when the number of ollege basketball referees inreased from two to three the
number of fouls dropped by more than 30 perent, though the eet might also be driven by strategi in-
terations between referees. Due to oding errors the initially very preise estimates lost some signiane
(Huthinson and Yates, 2007, MCormik and Tollison, 2007).
6
Setion 6 shows that not only does one need strong assumptions to move from an
individual behavioral model of rime to aggregate rime regressions, but that suh ag-
gregation is even more problemati when riminals are not (forefully) assumed to be
onetime riminals. When aggregating over reurrent riminals learane rates not only
generate linear deterrene eets but also highly onvex inapaitation eets.
18
Due to the limitation of suh aggregate rime regressions, researhers have reently
used more disaggregated data over time and spae, and quasi-experimental designs to
unover the mehanism behind the redution in rime when poliing inreases. Two
reent papers, Di Tella and Shargrodsky (2004), and Draa et al. (2011) use terrorism-
related events to estimate the rime-polie relationship.
19 20
Sine the terror attaks
indue a highly visible inrease in polie presene in partiular loations, the observed
drop in rime is likely due to deterrene.
21
2.1 The Ideal Experiment
In the ideal experiment aimed at measuring inapaitation the treatment, meaning the
inrease in poliing, should not only be randomly assigned but also unnotieable. Any
notieable hange in polie presene ould potentially generate deterrene. And, as a
response to deterrene, riminals might avoid ompliane by either moving out of a treated
region or by waiting until treatment is over. In priniple the ideal way to measure the
inapaitation eet of having more polie patrolling would be to keep the same number
of polie ars in treated and ontrol areasgenerating the same deterrene eetsbut vary
18
Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar (1973)'s and Shinnar and Shinnar (1975)'s model of reurrent riminals
would lead to the same onlusions. In line with the evidene about inapaitation based on miro-
level data, in Setion 6.2 shows that for some rimes, inluding robberies, aggregate rime rates are
onvex with respet to learane rates.
19
A third paper, Klik and Tabarrok (2005), uses data that are disaggregated over time. The paper
exploits terror alerts and a time-series of daily rimes in the ity of Washington D.C..
20
A set of studies in riminology uses random hanges in patrols to test the eetiveness of polie
fores, but again the fous is on rime rates, and no evidene, again, is provided about the mehanism
(Sherman, 2002).
21
In partiular, Di Tella and Shargrodsky (2004) use very disaggregated street-level data on ar thefts,
before and after the 1994 terrorist attak on the main Jewish enter in Buenos Aires. The redeployment
was highly visible as the polie fores would be stationing in front of Jewish enters around the ity.
The authors nd that the number of ar thefts dropped in those areas that reeived polie protetion.
Inapaitation is unlikely to generate an eet that is irumsribed to a few streets, and so the drop in
rime is most likely attributable to inreased deterrene. Draa et al. (2011) use London borough-level
rime data before and after the July 2004 terrorist attaks. Their hanges in polie deployment omprises
mobile polie patrols, but oers were also posted to guard major publi spaes and transport nodes,
partiularly tube stations, making the redeployment highly visible. Sine the hanges in rime oinide
not only with the inreased polie presene but also with its redution after 6 weeks of high terror alerts,
the evidene is onsistent with deterrene.
7
the number of ars that are fully operational. The remaining ars would at as plaebo
ars.
Sine inapaitation has not just immediate but also umulative eets, a pre-post
poliy intervention in one ity would generate a gradual and potentially hard to identify
redution in rime rates. Moreover, as riminals learn about the inreased inapaitation,
deterrene would also emerge (assuming the eetive polie ars lead to additional arrests).
Alternatively, one ould use spatial variation in treatment. In order to avoid interations
aross treated and non-treated areas driven by the mobility of riminals (ensuring what the
poliy evaluation literature alls the stable-unit-treatment-value),
22
one ould randomly
assign treatment to large areas, or better entire ities. But again, pereptions about the
inreased produtivity of the polie fore might generate inreased deterrene.
Instead of measuring dierenes in rime rates between treatment and ontrol, one
an move one step bak and measure dierenes in learanes and arrests (the mediating
mehanism).
23
Exploring suh mediating mehanism allows one to hange the time and
the area of treatment, reduing onerns of interations aross treated and non-treated
areas, as well as onerns about inreased deterrene in the treated areas.
This omes at the prie of having to ompute the inapaitation eets based on the
arrests. To ompute the inapaitation eet of poliing from an arrest one needs to know
i) whether the arrest lead to ertain prison time, and ii) the ounterfatual number of
rimes the arrested robbers would have attempted. Setion 6 deals with the onditions
that need to be satised to measure inapaitation eets based on arrests, while the next
two Setions desribe the quasi-experiment and the dierenes between the ideal and the
quasi-experiment.
2.2 The Quasi-experiment
The quasi-experiment that was briey desribed in the Introdution is based on quasi-
random redeployment of two polie fores, the Polizia and the Carabinieri, within the
same Italian ity, Milan, during shift hanges. Italy has two separate polie fores that
share the same funtions and objetives. The Carabinieri were the royal polie fore, the
22
The Online Figure 14 shows that groups of robbers tend to operate in seleted parts of the ity. But
these lusters tend to be quite large, and movements between businesses loated at opposite extremes on
the map are not unommon.
23
Inapaitation of ative riminals might in priniple indue also new entry of riminals Freeman
(1999). In other words, the supply of riminals might be elasti. While little is known about suh
interations, the supply of robbers operating in major ities is arguably less elasti. In Milan, for example,
there are on average less than two robberies per day, while there are thousands of potential ommerial
businesses to be vitimized. The rest of the paper assumes an inelasti supply of robbers.
8
gendarmerie, and despite the 1945 referendum that ended the monarhy in favor of the
republi, they were not dismantled.
Eah fore is responsible for keeping law and order eah in a dierent part of the ity.
24
For polie deployment purposes the ity is divided into 3 areas, North-West, North-East,
and South (see Figure 2); the Southern area is the largest, overing between 40 and 50
perent of the ity and 43 perent of the robberies (another 34 perent of the robberies
happen in the North-Eastern part of the ity and the rest in the North-Western part). At
any given point in time one area is under the ontrol of the Carabinieri, and two under
the ontrol of the Polizia.
Suh assignments rotate lokwise about every 6 hours, in onert with shift hanges.
Given that there are two fores, three areas, and four 6-hour shifts within a given day, the
Carabinieri over the same area during the same 6-hour shift only every three days. This
indues quasi-random variation in the days of the month, days of the week, and 6-hour
shift in the geographi overage of polie fores. Inside eah area there are about 7 to 10
ars that over around 120 square kilometers (40 square miles).
Eah square and eah dot in Figure 2 represents a dierent vitimized ommerial
business that based on the rotation mehanism has been assigned to the Carabineri or to
the Polizia. Outliers in the reurrent pattern are driven by oers who, as mentioned be-
fore, are part of the smaller non-rotating Polizia or Carabinieri fores. The neighborhood
polie fores, the mobile fores, and the motor-bikers follow the 8am-2pm and 2pm-8pm
shift.
As previously disussed, shift hanges are likely to disrupt poliing when there is a
shortage of polie ars, whih is unpreditable. I learned about the frequent shortage of
polie ars from private onversations with Milan Polie oers. While the Milan polie
fore has been unwilling to provide fatual evidene of this, I found loal newspaper
interviews of Milan Polie Union members omplaining about the sarity of working
polie ars. Aording to suh interviews about 50 perent of ars annot perform the
shift outside of the headquarters. When an extra outgoing polie ar is missing the shift
has to be performed inside the headquarters.
25
Whenever there is no suh shortage, the number of visible polie ars doubles, doubling
the potential deterrene eet. The assignments are binding, whih means that even
24
The rotating system is in plae in all major Italian ities.
25
Aording to the Polie Union SIULP in Milan there are between 15 to 20 Polizia ars patrolling the
streets, but on average only 25 ars are fully working (Biondini, 2011, Editorial Oe, 2011, Garofalo,
2013). I was not able to nd the orresponding numbers for the Carabinieri. Given that the two fores
are equally funded the numbers are likely to be similar.
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when there are two overlapping polie ars in a neighborhood only one is responsible for
maintaining law and order. The other ar would either be heading towards the assigned
area (before the hour) or towards the headquarters (past the hour).
Moreover, to redue the omplexity of the assignments proedure, there are no at-
tempts to aommodate delays. The Polizia and the Carabinieri are by all means two
separate entities: for example, they have separate emergeny telephone numbers (112 and
113), and the operators forward the all to the assigned polie fore depending on the
exat time of the all and the exat loation of the rime.
Delays of either the outgoing (the patrols might be in the middle of a task) or the
inoming ars (the ar might be broken, or the oers might be late), ould either inrease
deterrene or additionally disrupt poliing depending on the availability of overlapping
ars. The longer it takes to drive in and out, whih depends on tra and distane,
the more likely it is that for some time streets are less patrolled. There are no data on
average speed or on response times for polie ars, or data reording the exat loation of
polie ars over time. This means that there is no diret measure of the average redution
in polie presene during a spei shift hange,
26
but Figure 2 does imply that polie
patrols are moving in and out of the headquarters around shift hanges.
27
As a proxy for ongestion and relative speed one an look at the number of ars
that enter the ity enter and at the average speed of ity buses (whih is only available
starting at 5am). The Online Appendix Figure 13 shows that there is no ongestion at
night (average speed of buses is between 14 and 16 km/h), while the peak inow of ars is
between 8 am and 9 am, whih orresponds to the lowest average speed for publi buses
(8 km/h). At 7 am, 1 pm, and 7 pm the inow of ars into the ity enter is lose to 5000
ars every half hour, and the average speed of publi buses is lose to 10 km/h. The inow
of ars might be a poor proxy of ongestion in the afternoon when most ars drive out of
the ity. In the evening the average speed of publi buses starts inreasing at 6pm, but
overall shift hange intervals during daytime are not subjet to exeptional ongestion.
26
Thaler (1977) nds little evidene that response time matters, though response time is likely to be
endogenous.
27
The estimates measure intention to treat eets, or upper bounds of the true redution in the likeli-
hood of making an arrest.
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2.3 Addressing the Dierenes Between the Ideal and the Quasi-
Experiment
The main dierene between the ideal experiment and the atual one is that the time of
the shift hanges is reurrent and thus preditable. But what is not preditable is whether
there is a shortage of polie ars, and when and where suh shortage disrupts poliing.
Shortages are driven by unpreditable ar breakdowns due to aidents or ar failures.
If riminals knew that, in spite of the law, in some oasions there are not enough
ars to run the shift hanges on the streets, they might still prefer the lottery of faing
twie as many polie ars or half the number of polie ars over the normal number of
polie ars. Espeially if they knew that when there is an overlapping presene of polie
patrols only one would be fully operational. But the hoie of a partiular time ould also
be driven by unobserved or partially-observed fators (i.e. opening hours, ash holdings,
weather onditions, rowding, visibility, et.).
A more stringent test for whether robbers are knowledgable is based on their hoie
of the loation of vitims during shift hanges. Disruption is likely to be inreasing with
the distane from the headquarters, but this also depends on the strategies put in plae
by the polie fores.
28
In order to redue unpaid overtime the Polizia and the Carabinieri
might be tempted to selet overlapping patrols to be lose to the headquarters.
29
Sine
the disruption of ar on ar shifts inreases with the distane from the headquarters,
robbers would have a strong inentive to target vitims that are loated far from the
headquarters.
But rather than minimizing overtime the polie fores might shedule overlapping
patrols to minimize disruption. This would immediately imply that they would have to
randomize. One an think of their problem as a zero-sum game where the polie fore
maximizes and robbers minimize arrest probabilities. For simpliity one an think that
during a ar on ar shift hange both agents need to hoose whether to target vitims
(the robber) or protet vitims (the polie fore) that are loated either lose or far from
the headquarters. A disagreement in hoies benets robbers while an agreement benets
polie fores. Suh a game has only mixed strategy equilibria, and so one would expet
the polie to randomize the assignment of ar on ar shift hanges.
30
28
Aording to private onversations I had with polie oers, the ar on ar shift hanges are not
hosen strategially.
29
Aording to a ontratual agreement the extra minutes spent on the street during overlapping polie
patrolling are unpaid.
30
The Online appendix Table 12 shows the normal form game where the payos have been hosen to
resemble the estimated dierenes in learane rates.
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Moreover, in an attempt to minimize the expeted disruption due to a shortage, the
polie would have to assign more frequently ordinary shift hanges to those neighborhoods
that are more vulnerable, more vitimized, and where disruption is greater. Sine the
duration and the intensity of the disruption is inreasing in the distane from the polie
headquarters (see Setion 4.2), the polie fores would have an inentive to more frequently
maintain ordinary shift hanges in neighborhoods that are loated farther away from the
headquarters. Yet, beause of the inreased disruption, knowledgable riminals would be
more likely to target businesses that are distant from the polie headquarters.
Summing up, based on the evidene of disruption during shift hanges and no matter
what the objetive funtion of the polie fore is, an exess mass of robberies against om-
merial business that are loated far from the headquarters during a shift hange would
be evidene that robbers exploit shift hanges, and that shift hanges generate negative
deterrene. The formal test is a dierene in dierenes in the fration of robberies de-
pending on loation (below/above median distane from the headquarters) and time (shift
hange status) of the robbery. This is the simplest and yet most powerful test for whether
riminals are aware of the vulnerability of law enforement during shift hanges.
The additional advantage of the dierene in dierene test is that it ontrols for any
unobserved fators that inuene the optimal timing of robberies as long as they do not
depend on the distane from the headquarters (see Setion 5).
The data also allow for a whole battery of additional tests that for brevity an be
found in the Online Appendix B. Seletion that is driven by knowledgable and smart
robbers would typially produe positive answers to some of the following questions: Is
the modus operandi of robberies that happen during shift hanges dierent from all the
others?
31
Are able robbers, dened as those who are more unpreditable and, therefore,
more suessful, more likely to target businesses during shift hanges? Does ontrolling
for the experiene of robbers, measured by the number of suessful robberies, alter the
results? Are robbers who happened to ommit a robbery during a shift hange (and thus
might have learned about the deienies in poliing) more likely to do so again in their
subsequent robbery? Do the ndings dier when foussing on robbers who for the rst
time happen to perform a robbery during a shift hange, and therefore are less likely to
have deliberately hosen suh periods? These tests are inreasingly able to detet whether
at least some robbers are aware of the disruptive power of shift hanges.
31
The most intuitive way to test whether there is suh a seletion is to perform a balane test depending
on the time of the robbery. In Mastrobuoni (2011) I show that more able bank robbers tend to get larger
hauls with spei modus operandi (e.g. they are more likely to use rearms). Thus, one would expet
robberies that happen during shift hanges to be assoiated with larger hauls.
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3 Milan Crime Data
The area under study, whih omprises the muniipality of Milan (Comune) as well as part
of the smaller neighboring muniipalities around it (Provinia) ompares well to ities like
Philadelphia (Pennsylvania). The population of the Comune is equal to 1.34 million (vs.
1.5 million in Philadelphia), the land area under study is lose to 350 square kilometers
(134 square miles) whih is exatly equal to the land area of Philadelphia.
3233
Though
while Philadelphia has a retangular grid plan, Milan, like many historial European ities
(e.g. Rome, Paris, London, et.) has irregular ity bloks and a highly haoti network
of streets.
For investigative purposes the anti-robbery Polizia department of Milan ollets individual-
level information on robberies and robbers (not yet for the other rimes). After eah rob-
bery, even those assigned to the Carabinieri, the Polizia ollets all kinds of information
about the perpetrators, the vitim, the loot, et.
34
The Polizia omplements the information ontained in patrol reports surveying the
vitims, and olleting any available information that is reorded by nearby surveillane
ameras. Their main purposes are i) to identify reurrent perpetrators in order to predit
their future oenses, and ii) to provide proseutors with forensi evidene. This method
is known as preditive poliing.
While in the absene of vitimization surveys of ommerial businesses exat vitims'
reporting rates annot be omputed, aording to polie investigations these are lose to
100 perent. Evidene of this is based on riminals' onfessions. Sine most robbers are
aught in agrante delito they have an inentive to plead guilty in order to reeive a
1/3 sentening redution (patteggiamento). Indeed, in 2008 and 2009 all but one arrest
lead to onvitions for an average of 4 years in jail. Proseutors ask the arrestees to list
all their previous oenses. Again, there is a sentening inentive to do so whenever a
riminal believes that the the proseutor possesses evidene on past rimes. In exhange
for onfessing multiple rimes the proseutor agrees to onsider these rimes as one on-
tinued rime (reato ontinuato) for whih the sentene is onsiderably gentler than the
sum of sentenes that orrespond to the single rimes.
Aording to the Polizia only in one instane did an arrestee onfess a robbery that
had not been reported (later the business owner aknowledged this). Businesses might be
32
One an easily approximate the land area using a irle with a radius between 10 and 11 km (7 miles).
33
Aggregate rime rates and learane rates show that within Italy the ity does not represent an outlier
(see Setion 6.2).
34
The Polizia fore does not reord the exat loations of polie ars in every moment in time (suh
data would not just be diult to store but also quite hard to analyze).
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aware that the only way to inrease polie patrolling in their neighborhood is by reporting
the rime.
35
3.1 Summary Statistis and Balane Test
I have been given aess to a subset of the variables used by the Polizia to predit the
rimes between January 2008 and June 2011. The many variables that desribe in great
detail the physial appearane of robbers were not added to the dataset, while those that
desribe the modus operandi of the robbers were added.
In the data eah observation is a separate robbery, and 353 happen within 15 minutes
of a shift hange. The remaining 1,814 do not. The 16 perent of robberies that fall within
those 30 minute periods are higher than what a uniform distribution would predit, whih
is going to be disussed in great detail when testing for deterrene (Setion 5).
The summary statistis by shift hange status are shown in Table 1. Shift hange
status is a 0/1 variable that measures the hange in shift 15 minutes before up to 15
minutes after the beginning of a shift; for example, 6.45am-7.15am around the start of
the 7am-1pm shift. The likelihood of learing a robbery (by means of an arrest) during
a shift hange is 9.1 perent, while it is 14.8 perent during the rest of the day. The
third group of olumns shows that this raw dierene is signiant at the 1 perent level.
The only other variables that dier signiantly are the fration of robberies that happen
during the 30 minutes that preede the shops' losing time. Sine the exat opening
hours of eah business are not known, I use two proxies for the losing times. I divide
businesses into 23 homogenous ategories and take the maximum and the 90th perentile
of the observed time of the robberies.
36
While some businesses lose around the 7pm shift
hange (bakeries and jewelers), most lose around 8pm.
The Polizia uses information taken from surveillane ameras together with very de-
tailed desriptions by the vitims about the robbers to link oenders aross robberies. The
Serial robbers variable identies robbers who have been linked (70 perent of robberies
are linked to suh serial robbers). Figure 3 shows a sreen-shot of the software used to
reonstrut suh series. The variable Number of the series" indexes the robberies that
are linked with eah other in a hronologial manner. Suh number is later used as a
proxy for experiene.
The Polie variable indiates whether the Polizia handled that partiular robbery.
While the ity is divided into 3 parts and the Polizia is responsible for 2 parts, the
35
On top of this, businesses often need a polie report for insurane purposes.
36
The Online Appendix Table 11 shows the individual losing times.
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fration of robberies that is handled by the Polizia is slightly larger than expeted (73
against 67 perent). Before 2010 the Polizia was using a preditive poliing software alled
Keyrime to ath serial robbers, a software whih was later shared with the Carbinieri.
A few additional variables desribe the modus operandi of the robberies, as well as the
value of the stolen loot. Notie that the variables that are assumed to signal ability, like
loot, or the use of rearms (see Mastrobuoni, 2011) do not seem to vary depending on
the shift hange status, indiating that more able robbers are not targeting those periods
(additional tests for deterrene, based on the entire distribution of the loot are shown in
Setion 5).
4 The Eet of Disrupted Poliing on Clearane Rates
4.1 Simple Dierenes and the Event Study Design
The simplest way to estimate the eet of a shift hange on learing a robbery is to
ompute the dierene between the probability of learing a robbery during a shift hange
and the probability of learing a robbery during the rest of the day.
I take 30 minute periods around the time of the four shift hanges Tj (j = 1, ..., 4).
Later I will dene the intervals based on Google's estimated distane between the loation
of the robbery and the headquarters. For now, setting t to be the time the robbery ends,37
the j-th intention to treat (ITT) shift hange eet is simply:
δj = E(Y | |t− Tj | ≤ 15
′)− E(Y | |t− Tj | > 15
′),
and an be estimated on robbery n perpetrated by the group of oenders i using the
following regression funtion:
38
Yi,n = α +
4∑
j=1
δjI(|ti,n − Tj | ≤ 15
′) + f(ti,n) + x
′
i,nβ + ǫi,n, (1)
where f(ti,n) represents the underlying daily evolution of learane rates, and when |ti,n−
Tj| ≤ 15
′
the ounterfatual learane rates during a shift hange. The other regressors
xi,n are observed harateristis of the robbers and of the robberies.
For now, let us onsider the ase where f(ti,n) is onstant and β is equal to zero.
37
The median duration of bank robberies, whih are the most ompliated ones, is just 3 minutes.
38
All the regression are estimated using least squares regressions and lustering the standard errors by
group of oenders i.
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Table 2 shows that the probability of learing a robbery (the learane rate) is equal to
9.1 perent during shift hange periods and equal to 14.8 perent otherwise (as in the
Summary statistis table). Suh simple dierene, estimated using a linear probability
model, is signiant at the 1 perent level.
Panel B of the same table shows that the dierene is driven by the shift hanges
that happen during the day (92 perent of robberies that happen during a shift hange
period happen either at 1 pm, 22 perent, or at 7 pm, 70 perent). With the exeption of
the 18 robberies that happen during the midnight shift hange, learane rates are lower
during shift hanges than during the rest of the day. The 7 am shift hange, with just
11 robberies shows that one issue is sample size. None of the 7 am robberies are leared
and, despite the small sample size, this gives rise to a large and signiant dierene.
Small suess or failure probabilities with small samples ompliates testing of binomial
distributions, as small observed hanges in the number of observed suesses an lead to
large dierenes in the test statistis.
A rule of thumb to approximate the disrete binomial distribution with the normal
one is that the sample size times the suess and the failure probability are both larger
than 5. Some researhers use the uto value 10. Sine the overall learane rate is 0.15,
this implies that the approximation is good when the period's sample size is larger than
33 or 66.
39
Sine there are on average 45 observations in eah half-hour interval, in order to gain
statistial power I ollapse the four shift hanges into one period. This quadruples the
average number of observations in eah half-hour interval, improving statistial power.
There are two alternative models that an be used to estimate the shift hange eet.
The rst is to ollapse the shift hange dummy variables in Eq. 1 by onstraining δj to be
a onstant aross j. Moving the intervals by d multiples of 30 minutes from the true shift
hange periods the regression an be amended to ompute plaebo shift hange eets δd:




I(|ti,n − Tj + d · 30
′| ≤ 15′) + f(ti,n) + x
′
i,nβ + ǫi,n. (2)
39
For example, treating the n = 11 robberies that happen around 7 am as a independent Bernoulli
trials, the likelihood of observing 0 arrests with a known overall arrest rate of 15 perent is 16.7 perent,
whih is low, but above the 10 perent level. I simulated size disrepanies between the atual and the
nominal size when using a linear probability model of learing a robbery with lustered standard errors.
In line with the heuristi rule, the atual size of the test onverges to the nominal one when there are
about 50 to 60 observations in eah group. With 50 to 60 observations statistial power (at a 10 perent
level with an eet equal to -0.04) is about 30 perent, but is twie as large with 250 observations.
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When d = 0 the model estimates the ITT eet δ0.
The other model estimates the shift hange eets using an event study design. I
enter time around the shift hanges: ti,n − Tj .
40
dening d dierent event time intervals
entered around ti,n − Tj ± d · 30
′
, where the exluded time intervals are the ones with
d = ±1 and d = ±2, thus adjaent to the shift hanges. With the event study regression






I(−15′ < ti,n − Tj + d · 30
′ ≤ 15′) + x′i,nβ + ǫi,n, (3)
δ0 measures the dierene in the probability of learing a ase between 30 minute shift
hange periods, for example 6.45am-7.15am, and the two adjaent periods 5.45am-6.45am
and 7.15am-8.15am.
41
The advantage of the event time model is that all the plaebo oeients (d 6= 0)
are estimated at one. If hane was driving the results, the oeient δ0 (the true shift
hange period) would be similar to many other δds.
4.1.1 Results from The Event Study Design
Table 3 shows the estimated oeients of a linear probability model of a robbery being
leared modelled as in Equation 3.
42
The oeient on the Shift hange interval (SCI)
represents the dierene between the likelihood of learing a robbery that happened within
15 minutes of a shift hange, and one that happened during the two adjaent one-hour
time intervals.
Column 1 does not inlude additional ovariates x, while Column 2 inludes the two
variables that failed the balane test.
43
Given that the balane test was done only for
the shift hange periods, in Column 3 I also inlude the value of the stolen loot, a Polizia
dummy, a south and a north-west dummy, year by month dummies, day of the week
dummies, a rearm dummy, a knife dummy, a daylight dummy, whether the robbery is




Online Figure 16 shows the relationship between the time of the day and the event time.
41
The results are robust to the exlusion of longer adjaent time intervals, while hoosing a shorter
baseline interval redues the preision of the estimates, but not their level.
42
Given that in olumn 1 the ovariates are disrete and the model is saturated the onditional expe-
tation funtions an be properly parameterized as a the linear model. Using a probit model in all three
speiations (Columns 1 to 3) the marginal eets are almost idential to the linear probability ase.
43
In line with the small dierenes shown in the balane test, having no other regressors or adding
additional ones does not alter any of these results.
44
Controlling, in addition, for the potentially endogenous predited (by the vitim) age of the robbers
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Just before and after the shift hanges learane rates are equal to 13.6 perent, and
drop by -4.5 perentage points during shift hanges. The only other signiant oeient
(at the 10 perent level) is the one related to the interval that follows by 2 and a half
hours the shift hanges. Adding the two variables that failed the randomization test leaves
the shift hange oeient almost unhanged, and non of the other 30 minute period is
statistially speaking dierent from zero. In line with the results from the randomization
table when I ontrol for all the additional variables the oeient on the shift hange
period remains unhanged. Moreover, ontrolling for the additional regressors all the
other oeients are preisely estimated to be lose to zero.
4.1.2 Results from the Semi-Parametri Dierene Design
Instead of using just the adjaent periods as a baseline, one an retain statistial power
by omparing the shift hange period with the underlying evolution of learanes within
a day (see Equation 2). Rather than omparing the shift hanges to nearby periods, one
ompares them to their ounterfatual evolution based on the entire sample of robberies.
The underlying evolution an be modelled using dierent semi-parametri methods, and
the hypothesis an be further tested by generating plaebo shift hanges δd, d 6= 0.
Given that the time of the day repeats itself every 24 hours this is the ideal setup to
model time using periodi funtions. There is a large literature in mathematis and in
statistis on using series of sines and osines, innite and trunated Fourier series, to ap-
proximate any smooth funtion.
45
Sine time repeats itself in yles suh approximations
are even more valuable.
46
The underlying evolution of the probability of learing a ase beomes a funtion
of sines and osines f(t) =
∑k
j=1(γ0j cos(j × 2πHi,n) + γ1j sin(j × 2πHi,n)), where Hi,n
indiates the time of day standardized to lie between 0 (midnight) and 1 (one minute
before midnight). Based on ross validation the optimal hoie for k is equal to 2.47
Controlling for the underlying evolution of learanes, Table 4 shows that using peri-
odi funtions for f(t) the shift hange eet is between -4.9 and -5.0 perentage points
and pereived nationality of the robbers, as well as for their experiene does not alter the results.
45
A weighted trigonometri series of sines and osines is alled a trigonometri polynomial of order k.
Trigonometri polynomials have been used to approximate funtions sine Fourier's 1822 The analytial
theory of heat.
46
Andrews (1991) shows that under some smoothness onditions a trunated Fourier series estimated
using least squares onverges to the true periodi funtion. While suh smoothness onditions do not
apply to learane dummies the approximations turn out to be good.
47
This hoie serves a similar role here to the bandwidth parameter for non-parametri kernel estima-
tions. See the Online Appendix Setion A.1.
18
(similar to what was found in the event study design). Using a quarti in time or ubi
splines the results are similar.
48
Given the better t and the previous disussion the rest
of this study is going to estimate f(t) using either the Fourier series, or the event study
dummies (de fato the nearby time intervals).
The estimated true and plaebo shift hange oeients δd with the orresponding
95 perent ondene intervals are shown in Figure 4. There is a lear redution in
the oeients around the true shift hange, and, in line with the results based on the
event study, the only signiant dierenes are around the shift hanges. Notie that the
negative oeients at ±30 minutes might be driven by a mislassiation of treatment,
as at times it might take more than than 15 minutes to reah a given loation. In the next
Setion I will exploit the exat time it takes to reah a vitimized businesses. Moreover,
sine in plaebo regressions the truly treated time interval ontributes to the underlying
evolution (f(t)), the plaebo oeients tend to be larger than zero.
4.2 Shift Change Eets Depending on the Distane from the HQ
Up until now the shift hange treatment status has been based on the time of the robbery,
irrespetive of the distane from the headquarters. But around shift hanges Polizia and
Carabinieri patrols need to drive in and out of the headquarters, whih are loated in the
ity enter (see Figure 1). This implies that unless the polie fores use spei strategies
to over the ity outskirts (see Setion 2.2, during shift hanges businesses loated farther
away from the headquarters are likely to be less proteted.
The simplest way for taking distane into aount is to divide businesses depending
on whether their distane is above or below the median distane of all businesses from the
polie headquarters. Suh a dihotomous distintion allows me to setup a dierene in
dierene strategy. In partiular, I estimate Equations 2 and 3 interating the 30 minute
time interval dummies with the above median and below median distane dummies.
Suh a dierene-in-dierene strategy ontrols for any unobserved fators that might
drive the hoie of the time of the robbery without also inuening the hoie of the
loation (i.e. the exat business hours, the visibility onditions, and other unobserved
riminal strategies and onstraints). Columns 1 and 2 of Table 5 show the estimated
eets when using the Fourier series and the event time strategy.
The two set of estimates are very similar. During shift hanges the redution in the
48
The Online Figure 12 shows that exept during the night time, where the sample size is quite small,
the more exible semi-parametri funtions are similar to eah other. The quarti of time, instead, tends
to oversmooth the series.
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likelihood of learing a ase is indeed entirely driven by businesses that are loated more
than 15 minutes away from the headquarters (the median time to reah a vitimized
business aording to Google Maps). For brevity I do not inlude all the interated event
time dummies, but all those that are not shown are preisely estimated to be lose to zero.
The dierene between the shift hange eets when the distane is above of below the
median has a p-value of 5 perent when using the more eient semi-parametri Fourier
series while it is lose to 10 perent when using the less eient nonparametri event time
model. Later, when testing for deterrene I am going to exploit this additional dierene.
Given that the Polizia might potentially better oordinate the shift hanges whenever
they keep ontrol over the same area aross ontiguous shifts (I dene suh shifts as
smooth),
49
in Columns 3 and 4 I separate the smooth and non-smooth shift hanges.
There do not seem to be large dierenes based on whether the polie fores retains ontrol
over an area, showing that lak of oordination happens also within the Polizia, but lak
of statistial power disallows any further inferenes.
It follows from these results that using 15 minutes before and after to dene the
intention to treat status might not always be orret. In order to take the exat distane
from the headquarters into aount, I dene whether the polie patrol was potentially too
far from the rime sene to reah it on time. I use the atual time τi,n it takes to travel
from the headquarters to the rime sene, and given that Google's estimated durations
for Italy do not take tra into aount, I inate the time τi,n by a onstant κ ≥ 1 to
dene the intention to treat status:"
I(|ti,n − T | ≤ κτi,n). (4)
Table 6 presents the estimated δs using κ from 1 to 1.5 in inrements of 1/10, based
on Fourier regressions (Columns 1 and 2) and on ±1h15m around shift hange samples
(Columns 3 and 4). In line with a more preise treatment status, the results are larger
than before. The largest shift hange eets are obtained when using κ = 1.2, meaning
that for polie patrols Google's estimated travel time is 20 perent lower than the atual
one, or that patrols tend to antiipate the end or delay the start of their shift.
49
Given that there are 2 areas out of three that are overed by the Polizia the fration of suh areas is
approximately equal to 30 perent.
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5 Testing for Deterrene
There are several statistis that ould signal the presene of deterrene related to shift
hanges. Deterrene would lead to dierenes in the distribution, omposition, as well as
evolution of robberies.
5.1 Distribution of Robberies and Congestion
Let us start with the distribution. The distribution of robberies by time of the day shows
that the exess mass is driven by robberies that happen when businesses are about to
lose, around both lunh time and dinner time (see Figure 5, time goes from 0 to 24).
Most business are only open during the day, typially between 8 am and 8 pm, whih is
when most robberies take plae.
50
5.1.1 Congestion
Shift hanges are lose to suh spikes, and thus one might worry that the produtivity of
the polie patrols suer beause of ongestion. Yet, sine there is on average less than one
robbery in eah shift (exatly 0.375), this hannel is unlikely to be an important one.
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A simple way to test for ongestion is to restrit the analysis to the set of rst robberies
of the day.
If in a given day the polie oers are busy investigating the rst robbery, for the
subsequent ones the produtivity may be harmed. This would be partiularly troublesome
in ase of ongestion. Table 7 omputes the shift hange eets foussing on the very rst
robbery of the day that a given polie fore has to deal with. If anything, ongestion
appears to bias the eets towards zero.
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Figure 6 shows the distribution for major rime ategories.
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In order to see whether other rimes produe ongestion eets during shift hanges, I use the
average daily number of thefts in 15 minute intervals that happened between 2009 and 2010 in Milan.
These tables are based on the oial polie reports olleted by the Central Polie Department in Rome
(Servizio Analisi Criminale). The daily number of thefts are shown in Figure 6. I redue the heaping at
[0-14℄ minute and [30-44℄ minute intervals shown in the Online Appendix Figure 15 distributing a mass
proportional to the relative degree of heaping to the [15-29℄ and [45-59℄ minute intervals. The assumption
is that over the entire day thefts are uniformly distributed over the four 15-minute intervals. While there
are on average only 1.5 robberies eah day, every 15 minutes there are about 3 thefts. None of the average
number of thefts shows a lear spike during shift hanges. The numbers are typially higher either before
or after the shift hanges. Bag-snathing and pik-poketing rimes tend to be high during the entire day,
while burglaries spike in the morning when vitims are likely to realize the theft. Other kinds of thefts
spike around 8pm. I would like to thank Ernesto Savona from Transrime, the Joint Researh Centre on
Transnational Crime, for sharing these data.
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5.1.2 Distribution
In the absene of ongestion, a mass around shift hanges might still signal that riminals
know about potential polie disruptions around shift hanges.
52
And if the more knowl-
edgable robbers were also the more able ones, heterogeneity in knowledge would generate
heterogeneity in ability, whih might bias the shift hange eets downward.
First I test for a mass point around shift hange periods, while later I will test for
dierenes in ability between robbers depending on whether they selet suh periods.
In order to generate a single test statisti I mimi the analysis performed for the
likelihood of learing a ase, estimating Equation 2 and 3 using the number of robberies
as the dependent variable. But before running the regressions it is useful to look at the
histogram of the the time entered around shift hanges. Figure 7 shows the histogram
in 15 minute bins of the event time (left panel) and of the absolute value of event time
(right panel). Taking the absolute value ollapses the potential jump 15 minutes before
shift hanges (the rst vertial line, -0.25) and the potential jump 15 minutes after shift
hanges (the seond vertial line, +0.25) into one potential jump (+0.25). In line with the
time of the day histogram (Figure 5) there is evidene of a disontinuity at -0.25 and at
+0.25, but no matter whih histogram one looks at, the diretion of the jump is opposite
of the one that (lak of) deterrene would generate.Yet, Figure 7 does show evidene of a
drop 45 minutes before and after shift hanges (0.75 of one hour).
But these drops do not seem to be related to an endogenous response of robbers
when exploiting the heterogeneity based on distane from the headquarters. Unobserved
onditions faed by robbers (i.e. the exat opening time of businesses, the visibility on
the street and inside the business premises due to weather onditions, sunlight, et.) as
well as their individual onstraints (i.e. their working hours in legitimate jobs, et.) ould
be ontributing to suh drop. Sine these onditions and onstraints are not hanging
with the distane from the headquarters and the polie disruptions were onentrated far
from the headquarters, one an ompare learanes of robberies that happen far from the
headquarters with those that happen near the headquarters.
Figure 8 shows the two histograms onditional on whether the businesses are below or
above the median distane from the headquarters. There are no dierenes at 45 minutes
and also very little evidene of dierential drops at 15 minutes: while for distanes above
the median the mass of robberies that happen during a shift hange is slightly larger
(though as will be shown not in a signiant way), the jump is still positive instead of
negative at +0.25 (15 minutes).
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Evidene that thefts and burglaries do not luster around shift hanges is shown in Figure 6.
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There is also no evidene that the smoothness of the shift hange matters for the
distribution of event time. Whether these dierenes are signiant is shown in Table 8.
The table presents Poisson model estimates of shift hange eets, where the dependent
variable is the number of robberies aggregated by 15 minute periods (96), by area (north-
east, north-west, south), by median distane from the headquarters (HQ), and by shift
hange day type (from 1 to 3). So there are a total of 1,656 observations. All estimates
an be interpreted as semi-elastiities. While there is some evidene that robberies spike
around shift hanges when ompared to ontrol periods (in the event study approah
the ontrol period is 1 hour and 15 minutes from the shift hange interval), there is no
evidene that during shift hanges robbers are more likely to target businesses that are
loated farther away from the headquarters, whih is when and where the entire disruption
takes plae. Columns 3 and 4 show that the number of robberies does not dier depending
on whether the Polizia maintains ontrol over the area (smooth hangeover).
5.2 Disontinuities among Regressors
While it has been ompletely ruled out that ongestion is driving the redution in polie
performane during shift hanges, and there is no evidene that during shift hanges many
robbers are atively seleting businesses that are loated far from the polie headquarters,
balane tests an tell us whether those who do selet the right time and plae appear to
be more able riminals. Beyond making a safe esape, the other most important measure
of suess is the value of the loot.
While the summary statistis table showed that the loot, as well as the other hara-
teristis of robbers and robberies during shift hanges dier little with respet to the rest
of the day, there might still be disontinuities around shift hanges. The upper panel of
Table 9 performs the test for disontinuities for ovariates around the shift hange, using
the Fourier as well as the ±1h15min before and after shift hange sample. The lower
panel shows the dierene-in-dierene estimate, where the additional dierene is based
on whether the distane between the vitim and the headquarters is above the median.
The simple dierenes oinide with the dierenes shown in the summary statistis
(Table 1). Even the dierene-in-dierenes show little evidene of ability dierene, and
they typially go in the opposite diretion: robbers are less likely to be armed, and the
groups of robbers tend to be smaller.
Arguably the single most important variable to measure ability is the value of the
stolen good, and average dierenes might hide some heterogeneity (Bitler et al., 2006,
see). Figure 9 displays the whole umulative distribution funtions depending on the shift
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hange status foussing on robberies that happen lose to shift hanges (±1h15m). Using
a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test one annot rejet that the two distribution funtions are the
same.
5.3 Summary of Additional Tests
For brevity several additional deterrene tests are in the Appendix Setion B. In short,
there is no evidene that robbers who have the ability to be more unpreditable, beause
they target businesses that are less lustered in spae, are more likely to target shift
hanges. There is also no evidene of learning about the opportunity given by shift
hanges: robbers who targeted a shift hange are not more likely to target it in later
robberies. There is also no evidene that the shift hange eets are loser to zero for
robbers who for the rst time target a shift hange, and therefore are less likely to be part
of a seleted group of more knowledgable and possibly able robbers.
6 Consequenes for Inapaitation
When a robbery is leared and repeat oenders are arrested and onvited for a suient
period of time, hanges in learane rates indue hanges in inapaitation.
Clearing a robbery is almost always synonymous with at least one arrest.
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But will
the robbers spend time in prison?
Most robbers are aught in agrante delito and are deemed at high risk of reidivating,
and by law will spend their time in prison before the trial.
54
There is no bail system in
Italy. Moreover, based on data olleted by the Polizia the 31 series that were leared in
2008 led, aross arrestees, to a total of 203 years in jail, the 39 leared in 2009 to 217 years
in jail.
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Given that the average number of robbers per robbery is 1.5, about 100 arrested
robbers shared average onvitions of about 4 years of jail time (the legal minimum
mandatory sentene for robberies is 3 to 4.5 years, depending on the modus operandi).
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Of these robbers, only one was found not guilty and 4 were given alternative santions to
prison (e.g. home arrest).
57
Arrests an thus potentially lead to inapaitation eets for
the entire time period for whih robberies are observed (2008-mid 2011).
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Aording to the Polizia two times they waited to make the arrest of identied perpetrators only to
gather additional evidene.
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About 20 perent of Italian inmates are usually awaiting the initial trial.
55
For later years many trials are still ongoing.
56
Most onvited robbers would spend at least 3/4 of the prison sentene before release.
57
For later years some of the trials are pending.
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In order to measure the inapaitation eet one needs to reonstrut the ounterfa-
tual number of rimes the arrested robbers would have ommitted had they been free.Suh
number depends on the distribution of repeat oenders and their oenes, as they are the
ones whose arrest would generate a future redution in rime. Typial rime data do not
ontain any information about repeat oenders and arrest data ontain at most informa-
tion on reidivism, a measure that is projeted toward the past.
The panel dimension of the Milan reords allow me to reonstrut the survival table
of robbers. Table 10 shows the distribution of robberies based on the Number of the
series." The sample starts with 907 disjoint group of robbers performing a robbery. Of
these robberies 136 are leared immediately (15 perent). Based on the remaining 771
groups, given that 244 perform a seond robbery, the reurrene rate (the rate of repeat
oenders) is lose to 1/3. Depending on what one assumes about the reurrene of the 136
groups who were arrested after the rst robbery one an ompute quite narrow upper and
lower bounds of the reurrene rate. Conditional on having performed a seond robbery
the reurrene rate jumps to more than 80 perent, reahing almost 90 perent after
4 events. Given that all these estimates are based on the assumption that the Polizia
perfetly observes eah robber, they are likely to be lower-bounds. It is thus safe to say
that one in three arrests of robbers who are at their rst robbery generate subsequent
inapaitation eets. When arrested and onvited reurrent robbers generate muh
larger inapaitation eets, as they tend to persist in robbing businesses.
6.1 A Model of Repeat Oenders
At this point, in order to quantify inapaitation separately from deterrene it is neessary
to formalize the robbers' deision problem.
An individual model of rime where riminals an potentially repeatedly ommit
rimes ompliates the aggregation of rime regressions.
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At time t an individual de-
ides to ommit a rime when his/her expeted utility from doing so is positive




− π (c (p) , p)D [S]− ut > 0,
where π is the pereived learane rate (whih depends on the true learane rate c and
on the level of poliing p). U(Ŷ ) is the utility from the expeted loot, and D(S)℄ the
disutility from spending S years in prison; ut is the opportunity ost from ommitting
a rime at time t (e.g. legal earnings), whih is likely to be fairly persistent aross
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With the exeption of repeat oenses the setup is similar to the one used by Durlauf et al. (2010)).
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individuals. Suh persistene introdues repeat riminal behavior.














where F is the umulative distribution funtion of ut over the entire population. With-
out repeat oending (in other words with errors ut that are independent over time) F
represents the rime rate. When aggregate rime regressions are linear in learane rates
c, researhers are assuming that the errors (the outside opportunities) are uniformly dis-
tributed.
If, instead, outside opportunities hange little over time,
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and T riminal opportuni-











How does this funtion depend on c?61 While 1/c is learly onvex, for the umulative
distribution F (•) onvexity or onavity depend on the funtional form of π(c(p), p) and
on the shape of the orresponding density around the marginal riminal.
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Before using Equation 5 to separate inapaitation from deterrene, it is lear that
a onvex relationship between rime rates and learane rates would be separate and
additional evidene of inapaitation.
6.2 Aggregate Eets Based on Provine-level Crime Data
When using aggregate rime regressions researhers have often assumed that pereived
learane rates equal the true ones, that the distribution of outside opportunities is uni-
form, and that riminals are onetime oenders. Under these assumptions, based on Equa-













Aording to the Italian Statistial oe (www.Istat.it) in 2011 more than half of all unemployed
workers were unemployed for more than a year.
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Several funtional forms have been used in the literature. Among the papers that have estimated
the eet of learane rates on rime rates Levitt (1998) and Glaeser and Saerdote (1999) use a log-log
speiation, Mahin and Meghir (2004) use a probability odds-log speiation, and Mustard (2003)
uses a log-level speiation.
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Avi-Itzhak and Shinnar (1973) and Shinnar and Shinnar (1975) use a more onvoluted but also more
mehanial model to reah similar onlusions about the relationship between rime and learane rates.
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Sine earnings distribution are unimodal, the distribution of outside opportunities is likely to be the
same. Assuming that pereived learane rates equal the true ones (π = c) the relationship between F
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Based on the approximation of Equation 5, adding repeat oenders to the piture








Figure 10 plots 20 years of yearly provine level aggregate rime rates for robberies and
for motor vehile thefts against the orresponding learane rates (dened as the number
of leared rimes over the total number of rimes in a year). The relationship is strongly
onvex, and the simple re-saled predition based on 1/c ts the data quite well.64
While the observed onvexity represents external evidene of inapaitation eets, it
would be diult to estimate their magnitude based on aggregate data.
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6.3 Implied Inapaitation Eets
Instead of using the aggregate relationship between rime rates and learane rates, I use
the miro-level evidene on learanes c(p) and Equation 5 to estimate the inapaitation
eet.
The data do not allow one to preisely measure the redution in poliing during shift
hanges, but aording to the Polie Union the average number of working ars is 25,
while ars on patrol range between 15 and 20.
66
This means that between 1/3 to 2/3 of
patrolling ars need to perform the shift hange inside the headquarters. This also means
that for the remaining 2/3 to 1/3 of ars the shift hange is potentially less disrupting.
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In order to ompute average treatment eet (ATE) one has to divide the shift hange
eet (the intention to treat eet, ITT) by suh frations. With an estimated ITT whih
is lose to -0.05, the resulting range for the average treatment eet is between -7.5 and -15
perent. A treatment eet of -15 perent would mean that the likelihood of immediately
learing a robbery is lose to zero, whih is onsistent with the fat that most arrested
and c would be dereasing and onvex if the marginal riminal's outside option lies below the mode and
dereasing and onave otherwise.
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On a related note, trying to measure inapaitation using the relationship between arrests and poliing
would be a mistake. As Levitt and Miles (2004) and Owens (2011) point out, the theoretial preditions
about arrest rates are ambiguous. More poliing an potentially redue the arrests in ase of deterrene
as well as inrease them in ase of inapaitation. Sine Evans and Owens (2007) show that the COPS
program redued overall rime, while Owens (2011) nds no eet of suh a program on arrests, there is
arguably indiret evidene that deterrene and inapaitation are both present.
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Overall learane rates are known to be subjet to measurement errors. For example, the learane
might happen a year after the rime happened. Clearane rates are also subjet to seletion, as averted
rimes are not measured in c (Cook, 1979). Overall learane rates depend on polie enforement and are
thus likely to be endogenous. Moreover, even if F was uniform, the funtion that links pereived learane
rates to atual ones π(c(p), p) ould also potentially be non-linear (e.g. robbers might mispereive small
probabilities).
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The Polizia keeps reords about the outgoing and inoming polie ars for two weeks before destroying
suh information, but would not dislose suh information.
67
No equivalent statistis are available for the Carabinieri.
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robbers are aught in agrante.
One an use the ATE together with an estimate of the elastiity of robberies with
respet to poliing to evaluate the relative strength of inapaitation and deterrene.






and, assuming there is only an inapaitation eet,
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(using the midpoint between a redution of 1/3 and 2/3),
the implied inapaitation elastiity would be equal to -0.67. This would mean that about
2/3 of the total elastiity (-1.1) is due to inapaitation and the remaining 1/3 is due to
deterrene. Having in mind that the estimate is likely to translate into an upper bound
for inapaitation, the split is not very far from the approximately 50/50 split derived by
Levitt (1998).
7 Conlusions
Using preise miro-level information about robberies against businesses oupled with
some peuliar rules about shift hanges, this paper shows that disrupting polie patrolling
redues the likelihood of learing a robbery (i.e. arresting at least one of the perpetrators).
A battery of highly diverse seletion tests suggests that most robbers do not exploit
suh shift hanges, whih is likely to depend on their ignorane about suh dierenes in
learane rates. This might in part depend on the fat that exept for the time when there
is a shortage of polie ars and suh ars are physially inside the polie headquarters,
polie ars remain visible and might even be present in exess. Moreover, as previously
disussed, additional polie squads, whose ars are indistinguishable from those whih
rotate, do not rotate, and follow dierent shifts.
What an be learned from suh a spei low-visibility quasi-experimental hange
in poliing? If riminals are usually aware of typial (business as usual) poliing levels,
the ultimate eet on rime of typial poliing would most likely be a ombination of de-
terrene and inapaitation. Muh in the same way the redeployment of stationing polie
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The elastiity estimate is broadly in line with the US evidene. It is slightly lower
than Evans and Owens (2007)'s estimate (-1.34), and Lin (2009)'s estimate (-1.86), larger than
Chaln and MCrary (2013)-s preferred estimate (-0.56), and in line with Levitt (1997) (-1.20).
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I am also impliitly assuming that there large reoending rates, inarerations are immediate, and
sentenes last at least one year. All of these assumptions are met in the ase of Milan robberies but might
not be met for other rimes, or other ities.
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oers following a terrorist attak are likely to produe an upper bound of deterrene
and a lower bound of inapaitation ompared to a typial polie oerwho is neither
onstantly stationing in front of buildings,
70
nor onstantly driving around the itythe
Milan shift-hanges are likely to produe opposite bounds. The typial' polie oer is
likely to be less preditable than a stationing oer, and more preditable than one that
is rotating during shift hanges.
In terms of poliy impliations, this paper highlights an issue related to shift hanges.
During these hanges businesses loated far away from the headquarters need more pa-
trolling. In order to eliminate the shift hange eets the Italian law presribes to organize
the hanges out on the street, whih requires twie the ative number of polie ars. A less
ostly strategy that redues the shift hange eet is to have overlapping shift hanges.
For example, half of the Pittsburgh Polie units hange at a spei time, the other half
one hour later. If robberies were the only rime, one ould also time the shift hanges
when fewer rimes are ommitted (the Online Appendix Setion A.2 omputes an optimal
shift hange regime without overlapping).
As for optimal number of polie ars, the sizable inapaitation eets, at least with
respet to robberies, suggest that judiiary spending has to be taken into aount when
deiding about polie stang.
70
As in Di Tella and Shargrodsky (2004), Klik and Tabarrok (2005) and Draa et al. (2011).
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Figure 1: Headquarters' loation
Notes: The blak dot indiates where the Polizia and the Carabinieri
headquarters are loated. The squares and rosses indiate the loation
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Figure 2: Geographi Distribution of Robberies by Group
Notes: Groups are dened based on the exat day and time of a robbery. Coordinates use Gauss-Boaga
projetions.
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Figure 4: Shift Change Treatment and Plaebo Eets on Clearane Rates
Notes: Eah dot represents a dierent oeient, and the orresponding vertial lines the 95 perent
ondene intervals (based on lustered, by series, standard errors). Event time measures the time (in
hours) from shift hanges ranging from -2.5 hours to +2.5 hours. The estimate orresponding to the
event time 0 orresponds to the orret shift hange (entered at 12 am, 7 am, 1 pm, 7 pm). There is
one estimate for eah plaebo (event time 6= 0) shift hange shifted by 30 minutes forward or bakward.
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Figure 5: Distribution of Robberies
Notes: The histogram uses 15 minute bins.
The darker vertial intervals indiate the
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Figure 6: Average Number of Daily Thefts in
15 Minute Intervals
Notes: Based on 93 perent of all thefts that
ourred in in Milan between 2009 and 2010. The
series has been smoothed to redue heaping. Data
about reported thefts have been provided to
Transrime (Joint Researh Centre on
Transnational Crime) by the Servizio Analisi
Criminale (Crime Analysis Department) of the
Italian Ministry of the Interior within the
framework of the projet Crime in Metropolitan
Areas. Vertial lines indiate the half-hour shift
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Figure 7: Distribution of Event Time and Absolute Value of Event Time
Notes: Event time measures the time (in hours) from shift hanges ranging from -3 hours to +3 hours.
The absolute value of event time is shown in the right panel. Histograms use 15 minute bins. The
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Figure 8: Absolute Value Event Time Histograms by Distane from Headquarters and by
Smoothness of the Shift Change
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Figure 9: Cumulative Distribution of the Loot
Notes: The sample is based on robberies that happen within 1 hour and 15
minutes from the shift hanges. The loot has been trunated at e10,000. The
p-value of the two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of
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Figure 10: Aggregate Robbery Rates and MV Theft Rates vs. Their Clearane Rates
Notes: The dashed line simply plots 1/c. Based on 103 Italian provines between 1983 and 2003.
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Table 1: Summary statistis
Variable Shift hange Dierene
Yes No
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Err.
Cleared robbery 0.091 0.288 0.148 0.355 -0.057 0.019***
Number of the series 6.048 8.106 4.916 6.605 1.133 0.498
Amount stolen in euros 2814.365 12335.651 2862.969 10950.471 -48.604 966.598
Average age 26.616 11.777 26.558 12.599 0.058 0.720
Ages are unknown 0.085 0.279 0.104 0.306 -0.019 0.018
Firearm 0/1 0.258 0.438 0.224 0.417 0.033 0.030
At least one knife, but no rearm 0.110 0.314 0.089 0.285 0.021 0.019
Number of robbers 1.592 0.647 1.567 0.729 0.025 0.042
Some Italian 0.799 0.401 0.786 0.410 0.013 0.026
Shops' losing time 0/1 (90th perentile) 0.102 0.303 0.178 0.383 -0.076 0.020***
Shops' losing time 0/1 (maximum) 0.048 0.214 0.088 0.283 -0.039 0.015***
Polizia (Polie) 0/1 0.745 0.436 0.730 0.444 0.015 0.026
Serial robbers 0.629 0.484 0.574 0.495 0.055 0.031
Preditive poliing (Keyrime) 0.249 0.433 0.234 0.424 0.015 0.027
Southern area 0.428 0.495 0.436 0.496 -0.008 0.030
North-Western area 0.334 0.472 0.350 0.477 -0.015 0.029
Year 2009.246 1.030 2009.239 1.021 0.008 0.064
Month 6.074 3.800 5.838 3.698 0.236 0.235
Day of the week 3.278 1.921 3.228 1.809 0.050 0.112
Distane from the headquarters (in minutes) 14.762 4.095 14.246 4.457 0.516 0.276
Distane from the headquarters (in kilometers) 6.024 2.134 5.756 2.275 0.268 0.148
N. obs. 353 1,814
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Table 2: Simple Dierene in Clearane Rates
Clearane rate δ = (1)− (0) se(δ) N.obs
Panel A: Clearane rates by turnover
No turnover (0) 0.148 1814
Turnover (1) 0.091 -0.057 0.019 353
Panel B: Clearane rates aross turnovers
No turnover (0) 0.148 1814
Morning turnover, 7am (1) 0.000 -0.148 0.037 11
Midday turnover, 12pm (1) 0.104 -0.044 0.021 77
Evevning turnover, 7pm (1) 0.085 -0.063 0.021 247
Night turnover, 12am (1) 0.167 0.019 0.090 18
Total 2167
Notes: Linear probability model of learing the ase with lustered (by series) standard errors
(se(δ)). There are no ontrols other than the onstant term and the shift hange dummy.
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Table 3: Event Time Study of Clearane Rates
(1) (2) (3)
Cleared Robbery (0/1)
30 min. shift hange interval (SCI) -0.045** -0.050** -0.044**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
30 min. SCI shifted by +1.5h 0.013 0.007 0.004
(0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
30 min. SCI shifted by -1.5h 0.032 0.027 -0.022
(0.040) (0.040) (0.042)
30 min. SCI shifted by +2h 0.051* 0.048 0.009
(0.030) (0.030) (0.033)
30 min. SCI shifted by -2h -0.004 -0.011 -0.021
(0.028) (0.029) (0.030)
30 min. SCI shifted by +2.5h 0.014 0.007 -0.009
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034)
30 min. SCI shifted by -2.5h 0.043 0.037 0.009
(0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
Shops' losing time 0/1 (90th perentile) -0.029 -0.028
(0.021) (0.023)
Shops' losing time 0/1 (maximum) 0.011 0.026
(0.029) (0.030)
Other Xs No No Yes
Constant 0.136*** 0.143*** 0.311***
(0.011) (0.013) (0.072)
Observations 2167 2167 2167
R-squared 0.006 0.007 0.062
Notes: Linear probability model of learing the ase with lustered (by series)
standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The SCI
dummy variable is equal to one if the robbery happened in the following time
intervals: 6.45am-7.15am, 12.45pm-1.15pm, 6.45pm-7.15pm,
11.45pm-12.15am. The exluded time period is the 1h15min period preeding
and 1h15min following the SCI. The other Xs are the value of the stolen loot,
a polie dummy, a dummy for robbers with some experiene, the preditive
poliing dummy, a south and a north-west dummy, year by month dummies,
day of the week dummies, age, age squared, a dummy when age is missing, a
rearm dummy, a knife dummy, the number of perpetrators, and whether
some of the robbers appeared to be Italian.
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Table 4: Clearane Rate Regressions Controlling for Semi-parametri Funtions
of Time
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Cleared Robbery (0/1)
Fourier series Quarti in time Cubi spline
Shift hange 0/1 -0.050*** -0.049*** -0.051*** -0.052*** -0.043** -0.041**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Constant 0.158*** 0.158*** 0.156* 0.154* 0.158* 0.158*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.080) (0.080) (0.085) (0.085)
Shops losing FE No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 2167 2167 2167 2167 2167 2167
R-squared 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.011
Notes: Linear probability model of learing the ase with lustered (by series) standard errors
in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The Fourier series ontains 2 sine and 2
osine terms (the optimal size based on ross-validation) and the ubi splines is based on 7
equally distaned knots. Online Figure 12 shows the unonditional smoothed funtion f(t).
Table 5: Heterogeneity by Distane from the HQs and Shift Change Type
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cleared Robbery (0/1)
Shift hange int. above median distane from the HQ -0.077*** -0.073**
(0.028) (0.032)
Shift hange int. below median distane from the HQ -0.002 -0.009
(0.027) (0.029)
Below median time from Polie HQ -0.035** -0.024
(0.016) (0.023)
Non-smooth Shift hange period -0.039* -0.038
(0.022) (0.025)
Smooth Shift hange period -0.050 -0.062
(0.040) (0.043)
Smooth shift hange 0/1 0.012 0.028
(0.020) (0.027)
Other Xs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fourier series Yes No Yes No
30' Event time dummies No Yes No Yes
Observations 2167 2167 2167 2167
p-value for the dierene between the shift hange eets 0.0532 0.137 0.819 0.633
R-squared 0.067 0.066 0.064 0.066
Notes: Linear probability model of learing the ase with lustered (by series) standard errors in
parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. All regressions ontrol for the same regressors used in
Column 3 of Table 3. Fourier regressions ontrol for 2 sine and 2 osine funtions of time, while the
Event time regressions ontrol for 12 interated 30 minute event time dummies.
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Table 6: Individually Dened Shift hange Period
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cleared Robbery (0/1)
Turnover eets with Fourier `±1h15m'
κ = 10/10 -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.046** -0.051**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.022)
κ = 11/10 -0.054*** -0.054*** -0.050** -0.054***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021)
κ = 12/10 -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.054*** -0.058***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020)
κ = 13/10 -0.056*** -0.055*** -0.052*** -0.056***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020)
κ = 14/10 -0.048*** -0.047*** -0.044** -0.047**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.019)
κ = 15/10 -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.046** -0.049***
(0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019)
Other Xs No Yes No Yes
Observations 2167 2167 1316 1316
Notes: Eah oeient measures the eet of a shift hange period and refers to a dierent
regression. These estimates exploit information on the exat loation of the inident, and
Google's predited duration τ of driving from the Carabinieri or the Polizia headquarters to
suh loation. Given that Google's estimated durations for Italy do not take tra into
aount one an multiply suh number by a onstant that is larger or equal to 1:
Yi,n = α+ δI(|ti,n − T | ≤ κτi,n) + f(ti,n)ǫi,n. Fourier regressions ontrol for 2 sine and 2
osine funtions of time, while the ±1h15m regressions use only robberies that happen within
1 hour and 15 minutes from the shift hanges (in line with the event study dummies). Linear
probability model of learing the ase with lustered (by series) standard errors in






Shift hange 0/1 -0.073***
(0.022)
Individual shift hange κ = 12/10 -0.078***
(0.022)
30 min. shift hange interval (SCI) -0.073***
(0.024)
30 min. SCI shifted by +1.5h 0.052
(0.054)
30 min. SCI shifted by +2h 0.045
(0.050)
30 min. SCI shifted by +2.5h 0.031
(0.037)
30 min. SCI shifted by -1.5h -0.006
(0.041)
30 min. SCI shifted by -2h 0.009
(0.043)
30 min. SCI shifted by -2.5h 0.017
(0.039)
Constant 0.163*** 0.164*** 0.148***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Observations 1,297 1,297 1,297
R-squared 0.013 0.014 0.010
Notes: For eah day and for eah polie fore the sample is restrited to
the very rst robbery. See Table 3 for a desription of the regressors.
Subsequent robberies are exluded. The Fourier regressions ontrol for 2
sine and 2 osine funtions of time. Linear probability model of learing
the ase with lustered (by series) standard errors in parentheses: ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 8: Number of Robberies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Number of Robberies
30 min. shift hange interval (SCI) 0.401** 0.220 0.500*** 0.292**
(0.193) (0.280) (0.137) (0.140)
30 min. SCI shifted by +1.5h -0.943*** -0.829***
(0.190) (0.141)
30 min. SCI shifted by -1.5h -0.228 -0.218*
(0.163) (0.118)
30 min. SCI shifted by +2h -0.591*** -0.568***
(0.192) (0.149)
30 min. SCI shifted by -2h -0.296* -0.438***
(0.170) (0.125)
30 min. SCI shifted by +2.5h -0.419** -0.272**
(0.172) (0.109)
30 min. SCI shifted by -2.5h -0.678*** -0.513***
(0.215) (0.142)
Intervals interated with: Above Median Distane from HQ Smooth Changover
Shift hange interval (SCI) 0.166 0.158 -0.036 -0.035
(0.219) (0.362) (0.219) (0.229)
SCI shifted by +1.5h -0.111 -0.269
(0.251) (0.269)
SCI shifted by -1.5h 0.031 0.057
(0.221) (0.194)
SCI shifted by +2h -0.440 -0.294
(0.269) (0.280)
SCI shifted by -2h -0.354 -0.018
(0.236) (0.225)
SCI shifted by +2.5h -0.130 -0.090
(0.225) (0.208)
SCI shifted by -2.5h 0.363 0.328
(0.280) (0.241)
Above median distane from HQ 0.002 0.042
(0.066) (0.121)
Smooth Changeover -0.013 -0.003
(0.070) (0.097)
Constant -0.434*** 0.473*** -0.429*** -0.192***
(0.068) (0.095) (0.060) (0.066)
Fourier series Yes No Yes No
Within 1h15min from SC No No No No
Observations 1,656 1,656 1,656 1,656
Notes: Poisson model of the number of robberies aggregated by 30 minute periods, by area (north-east,
north-west, south), by median distane from the headquarters (HQ), and by shift hange day type
(from 1 to 3). Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. See Table 3 for
a desription of the regressors.
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Table 9: Balane Tests
Simple Dierenes
Fourier `±1h15min'
δ̂ se(δ̂) δ̂ se(δ̂)
Loot in e1,000 0.091 0.681 0.075 0.720
Average age -0.114 0.803 0.189 0.813
Ages are unknown -0.009 0.019 -0.017 0.018
Firearm 0/1 0.049 0.031 0.052 0.031
At least one knife, but no rearm 0.007 0.015 0.007 0.015
Number of robbers 0.065 0.044 0.077 0.043
Some Italian -0.003 0.025 0.011 0.025
Shops' losing time 0/1 (90th perentile) -0.161 0.024*** -0.118 0.022***
Shops' losing time 0/1 (maximum) -0.121 0.018*** -0.080 0.016***
Polie 0/1 0.010 0.026 0.017 0.025
Southern area -0.069 0.029 -0.055 0.029
North-Western area -0.041 0.030 -0.037 0.028
Dierene-in-Dierenes Based on Distane
Loot in e1,000 -1.131 2.150 -0.296 2.171
Average age 3.012 1.395** 3.279 1.372**
Ages are unknown -0.052 0.033** -0.052 0.032
Firearm 0/1 -0.029 0.052 -0.005 0.053
At least one knife, but no rearm -0.051 0.036 -0.073 0.035**
Number of robbers -0.115 0.077 -0.124 0.075*
Some Italian 0.050 0.047 0.068 0.045
Shops' losing time 0/1 (90th perentile) 0.088 0.046* 0.088 0.037**
Shops' losing time 0/1 (maximum) 0.049 0.035* 0.036 0.027
Polie 0/1 0.087 0.054 0.030 0.051
Southern area -0.032 0.058 -0.022 0.057
North-Western area -0.022 0.062 -0.012 0.059
Notes: Eah row orresponds to a dierent linear regression with the dependent variable
listed on the left. The simple dierene is the oeient on the shift hange dummy.
The dierene-in-dierene is the oeient on the interation between the shift hange
dummy variable and the Above Median distane dummy variable. Fourier regressions
ontrol for 2 sine and 2 osine funtions of time, while the ±1h15m regressions use only
robberies that happen within 1 hour and 15 minutes from the shift hanges (in line with
the event study dummies). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 10: Reurrene and Clearane
Number of Cleared robbery
the series No Yes Clearane rate Reurrene rate
estimate upper bound lower bound
1 771 136 0.15 - -
2 215 29 0.12 0.32 0.42 0.27
3 153 23 0.13 0.82 0.84 0.72
4 111 19 0.15 0.85 0.87 0.74
5 91 8 0.08 0.89 0.91 0.76
6 77 7 0.08 0.92 0.93 0.85
7 64 8 0.11 0.94 0.94 0.86
8 53 5 0.09 0.91 0.92 0.81
9 44 5 0.10 0.92 0.93 0.84
10 39 4 0.09 0.98 0.98 0.88
11 32 4 0.11 0.92 0.93 0.84
12 29 3 0.09 1.00 1.00 0.89
13 24 5 0.17 1.00 1.00 0.91
14 21 1 0.05 0.92 0.93 0.76
15 20 0 0.00 0.95 0.95 0.91
16 17 2 0.11 0.95 0.95 0.95
17 17 0 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.89
18 13 3 0.19 0.94 0.94 0.94
19 11 2 0.15 1.00 1.00 0.81
20 10 1 0.09 1.00 1.00 0.85
Notes: The sample starts with 907 disjoint group of robbers performing a robbery. Of these robberies
136 are leared immediately (15 perent). Based on the remaining 771 groups given that 244 perform a
seond robbery, the reurrene rate is 32 perent. Depending on what one assumes about the reurrene
of the 136 groups who were arrested after the rst robbery one an ompute upper and lower bounds of
the reurrene rate.
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A For Online Publiation: Appendix
A.1 Optimal hoie of k
To avoid overtting one an either use the Akaike Information Criterion, whih penalizes
the likelihood funtion inreasingly as more and more sine and osine terms are added,
or ross-validation, whih rests on out of sample preditions. In partiular, to predit the
outome of observation i one uses all the other N − 1 observations, repeating the exerise
for all N observations.71 Table 13 shows that using this simple but slow leave-one-out
ross-validation method, k = 2 minimizes the ross-validation mean squared as well as
the AIC objetive funtion.
A.2 Optimal timing of shift hanges
If robberies were the only rime, one would like to have shift hanges when most businesses
are losed and robberies are rare. The fration of robberies that fall within a 30 minute
shift hange period an be drastially redued from about 15 to about 2.5 perent by
deferring all shift hanges by just one and a half hours (1.30am, 8.30am, 2.30pm, 8.30pm).
One an estimate that the orresponding redution in the expeted number of robberies
would be lose to 6 perent. The hange is small but ould beome muh larger if riminals
started exploiting these ineienies.
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B Additional Tests for Deterrene
B.1 Correlation between ability and shift hange targeting
The rst two tests use very detailed information on the timing of the robbery but no
information about their evolution. Exploiting the panel struture of the data delivers
additional tests for seletion. These tests are designed to look for evidene of learning,
71
See (Newey et al., 1990) for a similar appliation of ross-validation.
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pτt,0, where pt,i = 0.865 + 0.05I(|t− Ti| ≤ 15) represents
the probability of suess of a robbery, whih depends on whether the robbery happened during a shift
hange period (the expeted number of robberies for reurrent robbers, meaning robbers who will not
stop robbing banks until aught, when their likelihood of suess is p is
∑∞
τ=1
pτ ). Postponing the shift
hanges by 1.5 hours lowers the probability P (|t − Ti| ≤ 15) from 15 perent to 2.5 perent, whih an
be gauged using Table 7. For reurrent riminals the expeted number of robberies would drop from 6
to 5.6. Given that there are about 260 rst time robbers eah year and that 1/3 of these are reurrent
oenders the redution in the number of rimes per year would be lose to 40. Sine the average haul is
lose to e2,900, one would redue the total haul by about e100,000 a year.
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testing whether at least some robbers systematially or at least after some time target
business during shift hange periods.
One should expet more able robbers to be more likely to target businesses during shift
hange periods, and robbers who learn about any disturbane to the patrolling due to shift
hanges should beome more and more likely to target suh periods. The previous setion
has shown that variables that related to ability do not vary during shift hanges, but the
longitudinal aspet of the data allows one to measure ability in a dierent way. Reurrent
robbers tend to be suessful when they manage to behave unpreditably, limiting the
eetiveness of preditive poliing. Probably the most prominent unpreditability fator
is the loation of the robbery. Robbers who tend to hoose business that are loated lose
to eah other are more likely to be aught. This an learly be seen in the rst panel of
Figure 17. The Figure plots, for eah of the 244 groups of robbers who performed at least
2 robberies, the total number of performed robberies against the average distane between
subsequent robberies. Keeping in mind that reurrent robbers tend to rob businesses until
they get aught the total number of business they manage to rob is a good proxy for their
rate of suess. Suess is learly positively orrelated with the average distane between
subsequent robbed businesses. Regressing the total number of robberies on the average
distane one gets a oeient equal to 0.53 with a standard error of 0.25. Given that the
average distane is equal to 2.45 km (1.5 miles) and the standard deviation is 1.63 km
(1 mile), adding a standard deviation to the average distane inreases suess by almost
an additional robbery.
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. Regressing the total number of robberies on the fration of
robberies that were done during shift hange periods one again gets a oeient whih is
positive and signiant. A standard deviation inrease (0.20) in the fration of robberies
performed during shift hange periods has almost the same eet as a standard deviation
inrease in the average distane. If hoosing a shift hange and hoosing the distane
between targets were deliberate hoies and were both signaling a higher degree of ability,
one would expet the two measures to be orrelated with eah other. Panel 3 of Figure 17




Running a log-log regression the estimated elastiity is signiantly dierent from 0 and larger than
20 perent.
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Inverting the regression the results are the same, there is no signiane and the slope is negative.
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B.2 Learning about shift hanges
It ould still be that robbers learn over time about the opportunities that arises during
shift hange. If this were the ase one would expet these robbers to start targeting suh
periods. The easiest way to see this is to observe the evolution of the time hosen by the
individual oenders aross robberies. The 9 panels of Figure 19 show the evolution of the
time hosen by the 9 most proli groups of robbers.
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Not only is there little evidene
of onvergene (learning), but for 7 out of 9 most proli oenders less than one in three
robbery falls inside a turnover period (individually dened as in Table 6 with κ = 1.2).
In order to see whether the persistene in the hosen time of the day that is visible
around shift hanges represents an anomaly, one an estimate whether the probability
of organizing a robbery during an event time period depends on having organized the
previous robbery during the same event time period. Using one again a linear probability
model, I regress the event time dummy Γci,n on the event time dummy in the previous
robbery Γci,n−1. Given the autoregressive nature of the regression I do not ontrol for the
Fourier series, but in line with the event studies, I selet the sample to be within 1 hour
and 15 minutes around the hosen event time. Figure 18 shows that the shift hanges
(event time 0) do not show autoregressive oeients that are any dierent from the other
event times.
Finally, another simple way to diretly test whether the results are driven by seletion
is to ompute the shift hange eet on the sample of oenders who have never before
organized a robbery during a shift hange. For these robbers a shift hange eet is less
likely to be the produt of ability. Table 14 shows that there is no evidene that with this
sample seletion the shift hange eets disappear, no matter whether the shift hange
periods are omputed using the 30 minute approximation, or they are omputed using
the individual information on the distane from the headquarters. This indiates that as
long as for most robbers the learning is not sudden and disontinuous, seletion does not
explain the dierenes in learane rates.
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The 9 groups of robbers organize about 15 perent of all robberies, and all the previous results are
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Figure 11: Aggregate Crime Rates and Their Corresponding Clearane Rates
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Figure 12: Predited Clearane Rates
Notes: The gure shows smoothed learane rates based on loal mean smoothers with a
bandwidth of one hour, Fourier series with 2 sine and 2 osine terms (the optimal size based
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Figure 13: Tra in Milan
Notes: The plot shows the average speed of publi buses in the ity enter (right axis) and the inow of
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Figure 14: Geographi Distribution of Robberies by Criminal Group
Notes: The plots are restrited to those groups who performed at least 15 robberies. In eah plot the
large blak dots indiate the hosen vitims by a separate group of robbers. In order to visualize the
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Figure 15: Average Number of Daily Thefts in 15
Minute Intervals
Notes: Based on 93 perent of all thefts that ourred in
Milan between 2009 and 2010. This gure orresponds to
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Figure 16: Event time vs. Time of the Day
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beta=−0.0035, se=0.0076
Figure 17: Unpreditability, Suess, and Shift hange Periods
Notes: Eah plot is based on averages over 244 individual robbers or groups
of robbers who performed at least two robberies. Distanes are air travel
distanes in kilometers omputed using Pythagoras theorem. The average
distane is 2.45 km (sd= 1.64), the average total number of robberies is 6.15
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Figure 18: Autoorrelation of Treatment and Plaebo Shift Changes
Notes: Eah dot represents a dierent autoorrelation oeient between seleting a shift hange or a
plaebo shift hange and having seleted one in the previous robbery. The orresponding vertial lines
measure the 95 perent ondene intervals (based on lustered, by series, standard errors). Event time
measures the time (in hours) from shift hanges ranging from -2.5 hours to +2.5 hours. The estimate
orresponding to the event time 0 orresponds to the orret shift hange (entered at 12 am, 7 am, 1
pm, 7 pm). There is one estimate for eah plaebo (event time 6= 0) shift hange shifted by 30 minutes
forward or bakward. In line with the event study, eah sample is restrited to 1 hour and 15 minutes
before and after the shift hange (plaebo or real). The autoorrelation oeients in the right panel
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Figure 19: Individual Time Patterns
Notes: Horizontal lines indiate the 30 minute shift hange periods around shifts.
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Table 11: Closing Time of Businesses
90th perentile maximum Freq.
Apparel shops 7:40pm 8:10pm 49
Betting shops 8:02pm 11:00pm 50
Travel agenies 7:45pm 7:45pm 10
Groeries 7:45pm 7:45pm 9
Others 8:00pm 11:45pm 202
Banks 3:45pm 6:10pm 237
Cafes 9:17pm 11:30pm 68
Gas stations 7:55pm 8:20pm 31
Newspaper stands 8:10pm 11:27pm 47
Esthetiians 9:20pm 10:30pm 12
Pharmaies 8:00pm 11:55pm 763
Jewelers 6:32pm 7:17pm 24
Hotels 11:00pm 11:46pm 28
Bakeries 7:10pm 7:30pm 11
Phone enters 10:35pm 11:06pm 24
Drugstores 7:45pm 7:45pm 26
Restaurants 11:46pm 11:55pm 33
Supermarkets 8:00pm 10:10pm 348
Tobao 8:35pm 10:40pm 59
Taxi 10:50pm 11:50pm 14
Phone shops 9:45pm 10:15pm 15
Postal oe 4:05pm 7:10pm 23
Video rentals 11:18pm 11:58pm 61
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Table 12: Zero-sum Game
Expeted learane rate C: 9%
ROBBER: max 1-C
Mixed strat. Eq.:
CLOSE to HQ FAR from HQ
POLICE: max C
CLOSE to HQ (20% , 80%) (5% , 95%) 1/4
FAR from HQ (5% , 95%) (10% , 90%) 3/4
Mixed strat. Eq.: 1/4 3/4
Notes: The Polie an hoose to keep the overlapping shift hange for the
neighborhood that is either far from or lose to the headquarters (HQ).
The robber has to vitimize a ommerial business that is loated either
lose to or far from the headquarters. The payos are the learane rate
(C) for the polie and one minus the learane rate for the robbers. The
learane rates resemble the estimated ones (see Table 1 and 5).
Table 13: Choie of Sine and Cosine Terms
sin/os terms δ se log-likelihood df CV MSE AIC BIC
1 -0.052 0.019*** -762.825 6 11.899% 1537.649 1571.736
2 -0.049 0.019*** -759.917 8 11.891% 1535.834 1581.283
3 -0.040 0.019** -758.308 10 11.897% 1536.617 1593.428
4 -0.034 0.022 -758.074 12 11.919% 1540.148 1608.321
5 -0.036 0.023 -757.456 14 11.937% 1542.913 1622.448
6 -0.048 0.023** -753.273 16 11.914% 1538.545 1629.443
7 -0.035 0.024 -751.095 18 11.915% 1538.189 1640.449
8 -0.029 0.025 -750.634 20 11.935% 1541.268 1654.891
9 -0.029 0.025 -750.615 22 11.960% 1545.229 1670.213
Notes: Eah line represents a dierent regression. δ measures the shift hange
eet, and se" is the orresponding standard error. Linear probability model
of learing the ase with lustered (by series) standard errors: *** p<0.01, **
p<0.05, * p<0.1. df measures the degree of freedom, CV MSE the mean
squared error in a leave one out ross-validation, and AIC the Akaike
Information Criteria.
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Table 14: Shift Change Eets Among Shift Change Entrants
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Cleared Robbery (0/1)
Fourier `±1h15m'
30 minute shift hange 0/1 -0.085*** -0.094**
(0.032) (0.036)
Individual shift hange κ = 12/10 -0.100*** -0.113***
(0.028) (0.033)
Constant 0.157*** 0.142*** 0.160*** 0.158***
(0.028) (0.024) (0.029) (0.028)
Observations 588 603 323 331
R-squared 0.028 0.029 0.017 0.024
Notes: The sample is restrited to robbers with some experiene (at least one robbery) who never
before organized a robbery during a turnover period. Turnover periods are dened using the 30 minute
intervals (Columns 1 and 3) or using the individual measure with κ = 12/10 used in Table 6. The
identiation of the shift hange eet is based on robbers who for the rst time fall into a shift hange
period. Fourier regressions ontrol for 2 sine and 2 osine funtions of time, while the ±1h15m
regressions use only robberies that happen within 1 hour and 15 minutes from the shift hanges (in line
with the event study dummies). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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